Equality for prospective people: a novel statement and defence by Voorhoeve, Alex
ARTICLE
Equality for Prospective People: A Novel
Statement and Defence
Alex Voorhoeve*
Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political
Science, London, United Kingdom
*Corresponding author. Email: a.e.voorhoeve@lse.ac.uk
Abstract
A possible person’s conditional expected well-being is what the quality of their prospects
would be if they were to come into existence. This article examines the role that this
form of expected well-being should play in distributing benefits among prospective people
and in deciding whom to bring into existence. It argues for a novel egalitarian view on
which it is important to ensure equality in people’s life prospects, not merely between
actual individuals, but also between all individuals who, given our choices, have a chance
of coming into existence. The article argues that such egalitarianism for prospective people
springs from equal concern for each prospective person and has plausible implications. It
further shows that it has a rationale in respect for both the unity of the individual and the
separateness of persons. Finally, it defends this view against a key objection and shows it is
superior to a rival view.
Introduction
When we consider possible future people, we take an interest in what their prospects
would be if they came into existence. For example, in 2019, there was widespread
reporting of the UK Office for National Statistics’s estimates for the life expectancy
of babies born in the UK between 2019 and 2043. One headline-grabbing finding
was that, due to a slowing of the estimated rate of health improvements, the prospects
of future people had worsened: the projected life expectancy of a baby born in 2019 had
decreased since the previous estimate (which was done in 2015) from 91.6 to 89.1 and
the projected chance of a baby born in 2043 reaching the age of 100 had been slashed
from 34.1% to 23.4%. A second much-discussed finding was the inequality in the pro-
jected life expectancy of girls and boys, with boys born in 2019 projected to live, on
average, 2.6 years fewer than girls, and boys born in 2043 projected to have a 5.3%
lower chance than girls of reaching 100.1 In this article, I refer to the quality of a per-
son’s prospects, should they be born, as their ‘conditional expected well-being’. I exam-
ine the role that the quality of such prospects, as well as the inequality in such prospects,
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1James Gallagher, Child Life Expectancy Projections Cut by Years, BBC News website, 2 December 2019
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-50631220> [last accessed 28 May 2020].
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should play in moral decision-making. I develop and defend an egalitarian view on
which we have special reason to improve the prospects of those possible people
whose expectations, conditional on existence, are worse than those of other people
who have a chance of coming into existence. Importantly, I shall argue, we have this
reason even in the absence of any inequality between co-existents.
In section 1, I argue that when deciding on prospective people’s fates, it matters
whether we are engaged in intrapersonal trade-offs or in interpersonal trade-offs. In
section 2, I propose a novel extension of a familiar pluralist egalitarian view. I argue
that this novel view coheres with egalitarian ideals and adequately handles both types
of trade-off. In Section 3, I defend this view’s focus on a person’s conditional prospects
rather than on their chance of coming into existence. In section 4, I consider and reject
the claim, advanced by Jake Nebel, that this view can select an alternative which is guar-
anteed to generate worse outcomes than another feasible alternative. In section 5, I con-
sider Nebel’s rival non-egalitarian view and argue that it fails to respect the difference
between intra- and interpersonal trade-offs.2 I offer my conclusions in section 6 and a
formal account of the proposed view in an Appendix.
Before proceeding, let me mention some basic assumptions of my analysis. The the-
ory I develop is designed for so-called ‘same actual number, variable-identity’ cases, in
which a fixed number of people will exist, but the identities of these people may vary. I
do so in order to extend familiar theories of distributive morality (which usually deal
only with ‘same actual number, fixed-identity’ cases) by one step into a relatively
novel area of application without dealing with the well-known challenges of variable
actual number population ethics.3 (The proposed theory does, however, cover cases
in which the number of people who have a chance of coming into existence depends
on our actions, even though the number of people who will end up existing does
not.) Moreover, I shall focus on the distribution of possible benefits rather than
harms and on possible lives that would be good for the individuals who would lead
them. The reason for doing so is that, plausibly, different principles apply to the distri-
bution of benefits than to the distribution of harms and different principles may govern
bringing people into existence with good lives than bringing them into existence with
awful lives.4 Moreover, I shall assume a cardinal, interpersonally comparable measure
of well-being derived from idealized preferences under risk.5 On this measure, when
a person’s chance of existence is given, a prospect has higher expected well-being for
this person just in case it would be preferred for their sake after rational reflection
with relevant knowledge while considering only their self-interest. One prospect has
the same expected well-being as another for a person if and only if, upon such
2Jake Nebel, Priority, not Equality, for Possible People, Ethics, 127 (2017), 896–911.
3For a classic statement of the challenges posed by variable-number population ethics, see Gustaf
Arrhenius, An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies, Economics and Philosophy, 16.2 (2000),
247–66.
4See Jan Narveson, Utilitarianism and New Generations, Mind, 76 (1967), 62–72; Jeff McMahan,
Problems of Population Theory, Ethics 92 (1981), 96–127; and Johann Frick, Conditional Reasons and
the Procreation Asymmetry, Philosophical Perspectives: Ethics, 34.1 (2020), 53–84. These limitations
mean that I do not consider objections to the proposed egalitarian view advanced in Toby Handfield,
Egalitarianism about Expected Utility, Ethics, 128 (2018), 603–11. For the principal criticisms Handfield
offers concern cases with variable populations and/or quality of life so low that it would have been better
for the person never to exist.
5Such a measure is commonplace in welfare economics. See Matthew Adler, Measuring Social Welfare:
An Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), Sec. 2.3 and Appendix D for a defence.
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reflection, one would be indifferent between the two prospects.6 (I will discuss in section
3 how to conceive of a person’s relevant interests when their chance of coming into
existence is partly or wholly determined by our choices.) Finally, in line with orthodox
decision theory, I assume that a moral decision-maker should choose the alternative
with the greatest expected moral value.
1. The moral difference between intra- and interpersonal trade-offs.
A foundational idea of the egalitarian literature on distributive justice from the 1960s
onwards is that a person’s life has a unity that a mere collection of individuals lacks.
This is taken to imply that distributive principles governing trade-offs between various
interests of a single individual, or between alternative possible futures of the same indi-
vidual, differ in key respects from principles governing trade-offs between distinct indi-
viduals’ well-being.7 The unity of an individual’s life gives us reason to make
intrapersonal trade-offs with an eye to maximizing this individual’s expected well-being,
as prudence dictates. The separateness of persons requires that when people’s interests
conflict, we give greater weight to the interests of those who are worse off than others.
To illustrate the moral significance of this difference for cases involving possible future
people, consider the following case, which contains two contrasting scenarios.8
Future Child 1. Through in-vitro fertilization, a child will be born to a woman who is
a stranger to us. The prospective mother will develop a condition that will not affect
her well-being. But this condition will, if untreated, cause her child to develop an
impairment that will manifest in early adulthood9 and cause it to have a merely tol-
erable quality of life (a well-being level of 30). The mother’s condition comes in two
types, type 1 and type 2. The type she will develop is independent of our actions.
Moreover, these types are equally likely and equally severe in their impacts on her
child. We can improve the prospects of her child in one of two ways.
Option A involves developing a treatment which will fully cure the child’s impair-
ment just in case the mother develops type 1 of the condition, in which case the
child will have an excellent life (a well-being of 90). Unfortunately, this treatment
will be ineffective in case the mother develops type 2.
Option B involves developing a treatment that is equally, and partially, effective
at limiting the impact of both types of the condition. It will ensure that the child’s
6In this assessment of a person’s prospects from the perspective of self-interest, I set aside any interest
they may have in fair distribution. I do so in order to clearly separate a person’s well-being from questions
of fair distribution.
7See David Gauthier, Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), pp. 121–27; John Rawls, A
Theory of Justice, rev. edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 23–24; and Thomas
Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 138. For the history
of this idea, see Bastian Steuwer, One-by-One: Moral Theory for Separate Persons (unpublished doctoral
thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2020), Introduction.
8Scenarios of this kind were first discussed in Michael Otsuka, Prioritarianism and the Separateness of
Persons, Utilitas, 24 (2012), 365–80 (pp. 369–70).
9The assumption that we are morally motivated strangers ensures that we are motivated by impartial
distributive ethics alone. The assumption that the health problems in question will manifest only in adult-
hood ensures that in the Intrapersonal Scenario, the individual’s identity is constant across the different
potential futures under consideration.
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well-being will be improved to a moderate level, which lies just below the mid-
point between an excellent life and a merely tolerable life (a well-being of 60 –
c, with c positive and small). In the Intrapersonal Scenario, precisely one embryo
will be implanted and the identity of the child who will be born (Chad) is fixed.
This scenario is depicted in the top section of Table 1.
In the Interpersonal Scenario, two embryos will be implanted, although only
one will develop into a child. The identity of the child who will be born is inde-
pendent of our choice and is equally likely to be Dylan, who will be born if the
mother develops type 1, and Ed, who will be born if the mother develops type
2. This scenario is depicted in the bottom section of Table 1. (The numbers in
brackets are the probabilities of the two possible states of the world, rationally cal-
culated given the available evidence. A possible person’s non-existence in a state of
the world is depicted by the symbol ‘--’.)
On some leading views of distributive ethics, in deciding whether we should develop
treatment A or B, it makes no difference in which of these scenarios we find ourselves.10
One might attempt to justify these views’ idea that these intra- and interpersonal trade-
offs under risk should be governed by the same principles as follows. In both scenarios,
the life of the child if his mother turns out to have type 1 of the condition is a complete
whole. Moreover, Chad’s life in this state of the world is just as good as Dylan’s life in
this state of the world. Analogous things are true of Chad’s and Ed’s life if the child’s
mother turns out to have type 2. Moreover, in both scenarios, once the state of the
world materializes, the alternative life is ruled out; in this sense, the perspective from
which Chad has two futures in the intrapersonal scenario is ephemeral, as is the per-
spective from which both Dylan and Ed’s lives are equiprobable. In terms of the
ways we should trade off possible improvements to these different complete lives, it
is therefore irrelevant from the impersonal moral point of view whether they are alter-
native possible lives of the same person (as in the Intrapersonal Scenario) or alternative
lives of distinct persons (as in the Interpersonal Scenario).
In opposition to this line of reasoning, I submit that it matters in which scenario we
find ourselves. In the Intrapersonal Scenario, if we choose to develop the possible full
cure (A), then it is a single person, Chad, who has both the opportunity of an excellent
life and the chance of being left with a merely tolerable life. Moreover, this option max-
imizes Chad’s expected well-being. Given our measure of well-being, it is the option that
is most choiceworthy on Chad’s behalf. Consequently, we have a prudential justification
10One view on which this would be true is utilitarianism, on which, in Future Child 1, we should choose
A for all c > 0 no matter which scenario we are in, since this maximizes expected total final well-being.
Another is prioritarianism for final well-being, which incorporates the following ideas: (a) increases in a
person’s final well-being have positive but diminishing marginal moral value; (b) the moral value of a per-
son’s final well-being depends only on their level of well-being and not on how anyone else fares; and (c)
under risk, we should maximize the expected sum of the moral value of each person’s final well-being. On
this view, there is some c > 0 for which we should choose B in both scenarios, and the largest c for which we
should do so in the Intrapersonal Scenario of Future Child 1 is the same as the largest c for which we should
do so in the Interpersonal Scenario. For a defence of utilitarianism which considers cases of risk, see David
McCarthy, Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II, Economics and Philosophy, 24 (2008), 1–33. For a defence
of final well-being prioritarianism under risk, see Wlodek Rabinowicz, Prioritarianism and Uncertainty: On
the Interpersonal Addition Theorem and the Priority View, in Exploring Practical Philosophy: From Actions
to Values, ed. by Dan Egonsson, Jonas Josefsson, Bjorn Petersson, and Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen, (London:
Ashgate, 2001), pp. 139–65.
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to Chad for choosing A. (Moreover, such a justification exists for A only.) If we do so,
however things turn out, we can explain that we acted for his sake by doing what, given
the information available at the time, we rationally took to be in his best interests. In
this way, the fact that the distinct, complete possible lives that are at stake in this scen-
ario belong to the same person matters to the justifications available to us. Moreover,
when we step back from Chad’s personal perspective and consider the impersonal
moral value of Chad’s well-being in isolation from how anyone else fares, there is, I sub-
mit, compelling reason to simply base our assessment of this value on the amount of
good we can do him. To do otherwise – for instance, to judge that an increase in
Chad’s well-being from 30 to 60 – c is morally more significant than an increase
from 60 – c to 90 even though it is not more important for him and we are focusing
on his well-being alone – would be to take a perspective on moral value that is curiously
divorced from the interests of the only person whose fate is under consideration. We
should therefore hold that expected moral value is maximized when we act to best pro-
mote Chad’s interests given the information available. It follows that for every c > 0, we
have decisive reason to choose A in the Intrapersonal Scenario.
By contrast, in the Interpersonal Scenario, if we pursue a potential cure, only one pos-
sible person, Dylan, would have an opportunity to benefit. For, in this scenario, this cure
will work only for the condition that would affect Dylan but will be ineffective against the
condition that would affect Ed. This means that, if Ed is born and the potential cure turns
out to have been ineffective, we cannot offer a prudential justification to Ed for our choice.
Instead, we can say only this: ‘We chose to develop the possible cure because this had a
chance of providing a slightly greater additional benefit to Dylan, who might have been
born instead.’ To this attempted justification, Ed could voice the following powerful reply:
‘Instead of exclusively promoting Dylan’s expected interests, you could have promoted
our expected interests equally. Equal consideration of our interests is inconsistent with
your setting aside all expected benefits for Dylan’s possible arrival, when instead you
could have divided nearly the same amount of expected benefits equally between us.’
This shows that the fact that the prospective lives in the Interpersonal Scenario belong
to separate individuals matters to the nature of the justifications on offer to the possible
people whose quality of life is at stake. Moreover, this fact is also relevant to our
Table 1. Final well-being in Future Child 1
Intrapersonal Scenario
Alternative
State of the world
Mother develops type 1 (0.5) Mother develops type 2 (0.5)
A Chad 90 30
B Chad 60 – c 60 – c
Interpersonal Scenario
Alternative
State of the world
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assessment of impersonal moral value in this scenario. For in assessing this value, it is
relevant that option A generates a situation in which of two possible children who are
equally likely to exist, one possible child has life prospects that are both poor and substan-
tially worse than the other child’s. In contrast, B ensures that these potential children have
equally good life prospects. For reasons I will elaborate more fully in the next section, the
relative poverty of Ed’s prospects under A depresses the expected moral value of that alter-
native.11 In sum, in the Interpersonal Scenario, both consideration of interpersonal jus-
tification and impersonal moral value should, I submit, prompt us to tolerate at least a
small loss of expected total well-being to improve the two potential people’s prospects
to an equal extent. It follows that for some, sufficiently small, positive c, we have decisive
reason to choose A in the Interpersonal Scenario.
I shall now develop a novel view which accounts for both this judgment in the
Interpersonal Scenario and the contrasting purely prudential moral reasoning in the
Intrapersonal Scenario.
2. Egalitarianism for prospective people
On a well-known egalitarian view, when we consider individuals who will certainly
exist, there is a presumption that it is unfair if co-existent individuals’ interests are
advanced unequally.12 On this view, these interests have two aspects. The first is the
value of each individual’s prospects – their expected well-being. This value is relevant
because it captures the extent to which a decision-maker’s actions advance each per-
son’s interests as rationally perceived with the information available at the time of deci-
sion. The second aspect is each individual’s final well-being. This is relevant because it
represents how well their lives truly end up going, and as such the interests that a
decision-maker should aim to see advanced equally, if they had full information
about how individuals would be affected by their actions. On the egalitarian view in
question, both senses of a person’s interest are important. It is unfair if some individuals
have worse prospects than others, because this means the ‘deck is stacked against them’.
It is also unfair if some end up worse off than others, because such inequality means
that some lead worse lives than others due to factors beyond their control.13
This form of egalitarianism is pluralist, in the sense that it also embodies a concern
for improving individuals’ prospects and final well-being. In sum, it holds that equal
concern for each person demands that we aim to (a) reduce unfair inequalities in
11Notice that, in contrast, in the Intrapersonal Scenario, Chad’s prospects are moderately good under A
and no worse than anyone else’s prospects that we are considering. These represent two further differences
between choosing A in the Intrapersonal Scenario and in the Interpersonal Scenario.
12G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, Ethics 99 (1989), 906–44; Larry Temkin,
Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Luck Egalitarianism
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015). In the cases I consider, there is no reason to override this
presumption.
13For defences of the idea that both inequalities in chances and in final well-being matter, see Alistair
Ulph, The Role of Ex Ante and Ex Post Decisions in the Valuation of a Life, Journal of Public
Economics, 18 (1982), 265–76 (pp. 268–9); John Broome, Fairness, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, 91 (1990), 87–101; Richard Arneson, Postscript to Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare,
in Equality: Selected Readings, ed. by Louis Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997), pp. 238–41; Larry Temkin, Inequality: A Complex, Individualistic, and
Comparative Notion, Philosophical Issues, 11 (2001), 327–53; and Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey,
Egalitarianism and the Separateness of Persons, Utilitas, 24 (2012), 381–98.
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prospective and final well-being between co-existents and (b) improve individuals’ pro-
spective and final well-being.
This view can explain the judgment in our Intrapersonal Scenario. Insofar as we con-
sider Chad’s prospects in isolation from how anyone else fares, inequality is not at issue.
The only remaining imperative is then to maximize the value of his prospects, which
requires choosing A. However, it cannot explain the proposed judgement in our
Interpersonal Scenario.14 Since, in each possible outcome, there is only one person
for us to consider, neither inequality in final well-being nor inequality in expected well-
being between co-existents is at issue. There is, of course, the other pluralistic egalitarian
imperative, to promote individuals’ well-being. But it is unclear how this should be
understood in this case, in which two potential individuals’ interests are in competition,
but there is no inequality between co-existents. This form of egalitarianism therefore
requires supplementation.
In previous work, Marc Fleurbaey and I advanced the following proposal.15
Motivated by the idea that egalitarian concerns must be limited to how co-existents’
prospects and fates compare, we proposed a form of pluralist egalitarianism which
incorporates the following non-egalitarian idea: it is more important to improve a per-
son’s prospects, conditional on their existence, the less valuable these prospects are,
even if their prospects are not worse than anyone else’s.
This view arrives at the correct verdicts in our scenarios. In the Intrapersonal
Scenario, it mandates A because this maximizes Chad’s expected well-being. In the
Interpersonal Scenario, by contrast, for a sufficiently small c, it mandates B, since it
holds that for c small enough, it is more important to improve the quality of a person’s
conditional prospects from 30 to 60 – c than to improve a person’s conditional pro-
spects from 60 – c to 90. Crucially, this is not on the grounds that choosing B would
avoid, whereas choosing A would cause, objectionable inequality between Dylan’s
and Ed’s conditional prospects. Instead, on this view, it is simply especially important
to improve Ed’s poor conditional prospects.
I now believe, however, that our proposal was based on too narrow a view of the
scope of egalitarian concerns. It therefore fails to capture the essentially comparative
reasons that, in the Interpersonal Scenario, it is natural to imagine Ed putting forward,
namely, that choosing A was incompatible with equal concern for each possible child,
because it advanced Dylan’s prospective interests only, when instead it was possible, at
little cost, to have advanced both Dylan’s and Ed’s prospective interests equally. This
reasoning can also be phrased in the following, less personal terms. Equal concern
for the lives of those who, given our choices, have a chance of coming into existence
requires that we adopt two broad aims: that whoever exists fares well and that the
world is equally well-prepared for the arrival of whoever might come into existence.
In the Interpersonal Scenario, A ensures that the two children who may come into exist-
ence have grossly unequal prospects. By contrast, B ensures that these two possible
children have equal prospects, and it does so at only a small loss in total expected
quality of life. In other words, A makes the world a much more welcoming place for
one of the two children who may arrive, whereas B makes the world just as welcoming
for any child who might arrive, at modest cost. Equal concern therefore requires that we
choose B.
14See Otsuka, Prioritarianism, p. 370.
15Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, Priority or Equality for Possible People? Ethics, 126 (2016), 929–54.
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Such reasoning is, I suggest, a natural way of explaining what makes it wrong to
choose A in the Interpersonal Scenario. It is also a more fitting extension of the plur-
alist egalitarian view under consideration than the non-egalitarian idea that an
improvement in a person’s prospects has diminishing marginal moral significance
independently of how anyone else might fare. For it simply applies the egalitarian
interpretation of equal concern – that it is important that people’s lives go equally
well and that their interests, as rationally perceived at the time of decision, are equally
well served – to anyone who we rationally believe has a positive probability of coming
into existence if we choose the option under consideration. Like standard egalitarian-
ism, this extension is motivated by the avoidance of unfairness. In the Interpersonal
Case, it would be unfair if all possible benefits were set aside for Dylan, while no such
unfairness would obtain if expected benefits were split equally between Dylan and Ed.
And while this idea is of course distinct from the unfairness of some co-existents
being less well-off than others, it is a straightforward application of the idea that
unfairness also inheres in a difference in expected well-being, because such inequality
amounts to one individual’s interests, as we rationally assess them with the informa-
tion available at the moment of decision, being advanced more than another’s.16
There is, however, one issue which does not arise when we consider inequality in
expected well-being between co-existents: when we evaluate the badness of inequality
in conditional prospects, we must consider the chance that the individuals in question
will come into existence. To see why, suppose that we were to change the probabilities of
the two states of the world in our Interpersonal Scenario so that the chance of the
mother developing type 1 (and therefore the chance of Dylan coming into existence)
is very large and the chance of her developing type 2 (and therefore the chance of
Ed coming into existence) is very small. In that case, the inequality in conditional
life prospects that a choice of A would generate would seem less significant than in
the scenario as it stands, in which each is equally likely to exist. When the mother
will either have a child with an excellent life or a different child with a merely tolerable
life, the inequality in their life prospects should be of greater concern when these pos-
sibilities are equally likely than when the first of these children is much more likely to
come into existence. More generally, a future parent whose child will either lead a good
life (if they lack a genetically caused ailment) or a poor life (if they have this ailment)
should be much more concerned by this inequality if the children are equally likely to
exist than if the former is, as one would hope, much more likely than the latter. To put
it differently: when only one of two possible people will exist, in order to eliminate a
given amount of inequality in conditional expected well-being between them, it is rea-
sonable to incur a higher cost in terms of expected total well-being in order to improve
the prospects of the child with poorer prospects when these individuals are equally
likely to come into existence than when one is much more likely to come into existence
than the other.
3. Why conditional expected well-being?
One may ask why the individual’s relevant interests are wholly determined by how well
they would fare if they came into existence and not (at least in part) by their chance of
coming into existence. After all, we are supposing that the life they would lead would be
good for them. Indeed, on an attractive measure of well-being, a good life is one that
16Here, I am disagreeing with Otsuka, Prioritarianism, p. 370.
8 Alex Voorhoeve
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820821000017
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.100.17.158, on 14 Apr 2021 at 07:09:07, subject to the Cambridge Core
would be preferred for the person’s sake to their non-existence and be such that their
well-being level, if they came into existence, would make their life better for them than
never existing.17 Wouldn’t it therefore be a matter of distributive concern to ensure that
individuals have equally valuable prospects of existence?
There are several reasons why the answer is no. For one, admitting an interest in
coming into existence to lead a good life within an egalitarian theory of distributive
ethics would seem to require that we recognize a tremendous amount of hitherto
unrecognized inequality, namely between all merely possible people who will never
come into existence and all individuals who will ever lead good lives.18 It would
also imply that, if faced with two possible people whose chance of a good existence
depends on us, we would have reason to give them a roughly equal chance of exist-
ence, even if the first of these people would, if they came into existence, have a better
quality of life than the second person would, if they came into existence instead.19
These unappealing implications are avoided if, as seems sensible, we assign different
moral status to, on the one hand, an individual’s interest in coming into existence
and, on the other, an individual’s interest in having good life prospects if they
come into existence. On this proposal, we have no reasons of distributive morality
to promote the former, but we do have such reasons to advance the latter, and to
do so equally. There are no claims on an individual’s behalf to be given a higher
chance of existence. But there are claims on their behalf to have the quality of
their conditional prospects (and of their life, should they come into existence) pro-
moted to an equal extent.20
The following case offers a good test of the intuitive appeal of this approach.
17For this measure of well-being, see Matthew Adler, Well-being and Fair Distribution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012). Against such a measure of well-being, John Broome argues that if living
with a high level of well-being is better for a person than never existing, then it follows that their never
existing would be worse for them. But the latter, he claims, is an absurdity, since nothing can be better
or worse for a person who never exists. (See John Broome, Ethics out of Economics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 186.) For arguments against Broome’s conclusion, see Gustaf
Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz, The Value of Existence, in The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory,
ed. by Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 424–44; Fleurbaey
and Voorhoeve, On the Personal and Social Value of Existence, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes
from the Work of John Broome, ed. by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), pp. 94–109; and Hilary Greaves and John Cushbert, Comparing Existence and
Non-Existence, in Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit, ed. by Jeff McMahan, Tim
Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021). These
responses to Broome’s argument show that it makes sense to compare a person’s existence with their non-
existence on their behalf; they do not show that we must make this comparison. A focus on conditional
expected well-being might therefore be justified in a different manner than proposed in the main text,
by holding that existence with a given level of well-being and non-existence are non-comparable on a per-
son’s behalf. See Jake Nebel, An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox, Ethics, 129 (2019), 309–43 (pp. 334–40).
18Krister Bykvist, Being and Well-being, in Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John
Broome, ed. by Iwao Hirose and Andrew Reisner (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 87–93.
19See case 6 in Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, Equality or Priority.
20See Melinda Roberts, Child versus Child-maker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the
Law, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998) and Peter Vallentyne, Review of Child versus
Child-maker: Future Persons and Present Duties in Ethics and the Law by Melinda Roberts, Noûs, 34
(2000), 634–47.
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Future Child 2. The basic set-up is as in the Interpersonal Scenario in Future Child
1, with the following differences. The mother has a one-third chance of having
type 1 and a two-thirds chance of acquiring type 2 of the condition. If she develops
type 1, the child born will be Fred, and if she develops type 2, it will be George. We
can either create a treatment that would deliver greater benefits to Fred and lesser
benefits to George, or instead ensure that whoever is born will have a treatment for
their impairment that ensures a moderately good life, while keeping expected total
well-being constant. The degree d to which we skew the treatment in favour of Fred
is up to us. This case is depicted in Table 2, with 0≤ d≤ 30.
If we choose d = 0, we ensure equality of conditional expected well-being. But we also
generate substantial inequality in the value of prospects of coming into existence, since
George is twice as likely to come into existence as Fred. As we increase d, we introduce
inequality in conditional expected well-being, but reduce inequality in individuals’ pro-
spects of coming into existence, until we reach d = 30, which ensures equality in the
value of prospects of existence, but generates substantial inequality in conditional
expected well-being. Which d should we choose? I submit that answering this question
does not require careful balancing of two opposing egalitarian concerns. Instead, it is
straightforward: we should set d = 0, and for very similar reasons adduced in support
of choosing B in Future Child 1. There is no claim on Fred’s behalf to be compensated
for his comparatively low chance of coming into existence, but there is a claim on each
possible person’s behalf to have conditional prospects that are not worse than another’s.
It would therefore be unconscionable to set aside the majority of expected benefits for
Fred, when we could instead divide the very same amount of expected benefits equally.
4. Does equality for prospective people violate state-wise dominance?
I shall now consider an objection raised by Nebel against the view advanced in my earl-
ier work with Fleurbaey, which also challenges the more thoroughgoing egalitarianism
advanced here.21 Consider the following case.22
Future Child 3. The basic set-up is as in the Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child
1, except that our options are different.
Option A involves providing the prospective mother with a treatment that is
exceedingly effective if she develops type 1 but that will have only a very minor posi-
tive effect if she develops type 2. Moreover, the treatment ensures that, if the mother
develops type 1, Hal will be born and have an exceedingly excellent quality of life (a
welfare of 90 + e, with e positive but small). If she develops type 2, Ian will be born
and his quality of life will be just in excess of tolerable (a welfare of 30 + e).
Option B involves providing a treatment that will ensure that Ian will be born. If
his mother develops type 1, this option ensures that Ian will have an excellent life; if
she develops type 2, he will have a merely tolerable life. This case is represented in
Table 3.
21Nebel, Priority, not Equality, pp. 900–903.
22My version simplifies Nebel’s Zygotic Selection Case and eliminates the following distorting aspect. In
Nebel’s version, the inegalitarian option involves ‘doing nothing’, whereas the option which eliminates
inequality in conditional expected well-being carries a substantial risk of causing physical harm. This biases
his case against the proposed form of egalitarianism. I avoid this bias by focusing solely on the possibility of
improving a child’s well-being.
10 Alex Voorhoeve
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A generates substantial inequality in conditional expected well-being between the
two children who might come into existence, with one potential child with excellent
prospects and another with poor prospects. In contrast, B involves no such inequality,
since the child who will be born will have moderately good prospects. For some suffi-
ciently small amount of extra well-being e, the egalitarian view proposed here therefore
requires choosing B.
In contrast, Nebel argues as follows that we should choose A for any e > 0.23 If the
mother develops type 1, A leads to a better outcome than B, because Hal would have
higher final well-being than Ian would have. If the mother develops type 2, A leads
to a better outcome than B, because it is better for Ian. Nebel then appeals to state-wise
dominance, which holds that if an alternative has a superior outcome no matter which
state of the world materializes, then that alternative is better. He concludes that A is
better than B and should therefore be chosen.
In reply, the proposed egalitarian view does not violate state-wise dominance. For,
on this view, the value of an outcome is not wholly determined by the distribution
of final well-being. Instead, it is co-determined by the final well-being in that outcome
and the prospects enjoyed by both potential individuals at the time of decision. These
prospects contribute to the value of the outcome, since they determine how well poten-
tial individuals’ interests were served at the moment of decision, and therefore how fair
this decision was. For this reason, if e is sufficiently small, our egalitarian view can judge
the outcome of A if the mother develops type 2 to be worse than the outcome of B in
that state of the world. The reason is that choosing A gave Ian prospects that were both
poor and worse than the prospects of the other child whose existence our choice made
possible. Both these factors depress the value of the outcome in which Ian is born. In
contrast, choosing B gave Ian moderately good prospects, which contributes positively
to the value of the outcome even when Ian’s final well-being is low.
Table 2. Final well-being in Future Child 2
Alternative: choose d,
with 0≤ d≤ 30.
State of the world
Mother develops type 1
(0.33)
Mother develops type 2
(0.67)
Fred 60 + d --
George -- 60 – (d/2)
Table 3. Final well-being in Future Child 3
Alternative
State of the world
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It follows that I reject the version of the Pareto principle which Nebel invokes to estab-
lish that A leads to a better outcome than B in case the mother develops type 2, viz., the
idea that if all the same people exist in an outcome and a first alternative leads to higher
final well-being for all of them in that outcome than a second alternative, then the first
alternative is better in that outcome.24 I reject this version because in considering only
final well-being, it misses out one important aspect of the currency of distributive justice,
namely, the quality of an individual’s prospects. In this respect, the egalitarian view I pro-
pose is akin to standard egalitarian views that care about the distribution of chances.25
Consider, for example, a variant on the classic case in which two equally situated indivi-
duals have only a few weeks to live unless they receive a kidney transplant. We have only
one kidney available, which we can either give outright to the first of them, or instead
assign using a randomizing device which gives each an equal chance of receiving the kid-
ney. Suppose that both patients are in pain, that effective pain relief can be given only once
we know whether a patient is about to receive a kidney (the kind of relief prescribed will
depend on whether they are about to have a transplant), and that using the randomizing
device costs time. Suppose further that we decide to use the randomizing device. If the
second patient were to lose out in the random draw, in terms of final well-being, both
patients may be worse off than if the kidney had been assigned directly to the first patient.
After all, the first patient will simply have had more time in pain before receiving the kid-
ney, and the second patient will also have spent more time in pain and still not have the
kidney.26 Nonetheless, even in this eventuality, the outcome of the random assignment is
clearly better in one respect, and therefore possibly better overall, because it results from a
fairer distribution of chances.
These claims about how the value of a person’s chances can affect the moral value of
outcomes fit with how these chances figure in interpersonal justification. In our kidney
case, if the second patient loses out in the random assignment, the fact that we gave
them a fair chance will be a good explanation to them for what we have done and the
extra pain they have suffered. Similarly, in Future Child 3, a child’s life prospects are part
of what we can appeal to in justifying our actions to them. As David Wasserman notes
in a well-known discussion of the ethics of having children, a person’s prospects at the
moment of their creation commonly figure in our justification to them of bringing them
into existence. Wasserman writes: ‘[T]he reasons that [we] can offer the child for having
brought her into a difficult and dangerous world . . . must . . . concern her own expected
good.’27 Pursuing this thought, Wasserman considers the case of a child who had reasonably
good life prospects at the moment we ensured their creation but ends up having a difficult
life (though one that is still worth living). He points out that we can offer the fact that their
life prospects were reasonably good as a justification for making their existence more likely.28
It is noteworthy that, in Future Child 3, we could offer a justification along these lines to Ian
for choosing B, but we could not offer such a justification to him for choosing A.
24Ibid., p. 902.
25See John Broome, Weighing Goods (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 111–15 and H. Orri Stefansson, Fair
Chance and Modal Consequentialism, Economics and Philosophy, 31 (2015), 371–95.
26Recall that, as outlined in n. 6, I exclude an individual’s interest in fair distribution from their measure
of final well-being.
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In sum, contrary to Nebel, in Future Child 3, the fact that A condemns Ian, should he
be born, to a quality of life that is both meagre and inferior to the prospects of the other
child we made possible, while B both provides Ian with reasonably good life prospects and
eliminates inequality in conditional life prospects, gives us good reasons to choose B. So
long as the cost in final well-being of choosing B is small, this reason may well be decisive.29
5. Against person-affecting prioritarianism
Nebel also proposes the following rival view, which is of independent interest.
Person-affecting prioritarianism:
(i) A person has a complaint against our choice if [and only if] both (a) there is
some alternative we could have chosen under which she would have fared bet-
ter [given the realized state of the world] and (b) our choice fails to maximize
her expected well-being, conditional on her existence.
(ii) The strength of a person’s complaint against a choice is determined by the extent
to which it leaves her worse off than she would have been otherwise, and by how
well off she is. A person’s complaint is stronger the worse off she is.
(iii) We ought to choose the prospect against which people would have the weakest
complaints, discounted by the probability that those complaints arise. If people
would have no (or minimally weak) complaints against more than one pro-
spect, then we ought to choose the impartially best [that is, the prospect
with greatest expected moral value] of those.30
The motivation for this view is that we have important reasons to attend to each indi-
vidual’s valid claims to have their interests promoted and to satisfy the most morally
significant collection of these claims. Furthermore, individuals have a claim against a
choice we have made if and only if a different action we could have taken would
have been better for them both (a) as things turned out and (b) in terms of their life
prospects. These reasons to attend to people’s claims may prompt us to depart from
what generates the best consequences; but in the absence of these reasons, we should
simply do what generates the best consequences. Moreover, as outlined above, Nebel
29Nebel also offers the following further argument using a twist on Future Child 3. Suppose that, in fact,
the woman in question will have twins. The identity of the second actual child is fixed (let us call him Jack)
and the two treatments under consideration will affect his well-being in the same way: if his mother devel-
ops type 1, he will have a well-being of 90 + e, and if she develops type 2, he will have a well-being of 30 + e
(e is positive and small). In other respects, A and B are the same as in Future Child 3. Nebel argues that this
case demonstrates further problems for the proposed form of egalitarianism. For, he notes, A will ensure
perfect equality of outcome (either both boys will have exceedingly excellent quality of life, or both will
have a tad above tolerable quality of life), whereas B will generate a small degree of inequality of outcome
(since Jack will always be slightly better off than Ian). But, for reasons already adduced, egalitarianism for
prospective people holds there is reason to choose B. Nebel finds it strange that one might tolerate a bit of
outcome inequality in order to greatly reduce inequality in life chances. There is, however, nothing peculiar
in this judgment. Pluralist egalitarians care about inequality in final well-being and inequality in chances.
They may therefore allow a slight increase in the former to greatly reduce the latter. See Ulph, The Role of
Ex Ante, pp. 268–69; and Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, Equality or Priority, pp. 937–38.
30Nebel, Priority, not Equality, pp. 907–08. Additions in square brackets are mine; Nebel’s discussion
suggests them, and Nebel confirmed them in conversation.
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believes that inequalities in conditional prospects between people who will not co-exist
do not affect the value of consequences.
On this view, the reason for assigning prioritarian weighting to increments in a per-
son’s final well-being is operative only in cases in which individuals have conflicting
claims to possible increments in their well-being. In this respect, and in its willingness
to depart from what it holds would maximize expected impersonal good for the sake of
satisfying the strongest personal claims, this view is a non-consequentialist, or deontic,
form of prioritarianism.31 It stands in contrast to consequentialist forms of final well-
being prioritarianism, on which final-well-being always has positive but diminishing
marginal moral value and we ought always to maximize the sum of expected, priority-
weighted final well-being.32 The differences between this consequentialist prioritarian
view and Nebel’s deontic prioritarian view are particularly clear in the Intrapersonal
Scenario of Future Child 1, in which final well-being prioritarianism holds that we
ought to choose B for some c > 0.33 On Person-Affecting Prioritarianism, in contrast,
in this scenario, Chad has no complaint against a choice of A, since that maximizes
his expected well-being. But Chad would, if his mother develops type 1, have a com-
plaint against a choice of B. The view therefore holds that we ought to choose A.
In this judgment, Person-Affecting Prioritarianism agrees with the proposed form of
egalitarianism. These views also arrive at the same judgment in our Interpersonal
Scenario. On Person-Affecting Prioritarianism, if the mother develops type 2, Ed will
have a complaint against A, which, for c sufficiently small, will be stronger than
Dylan’s equally likely complaint against B, since the amount of well-being at stake for
each is roughly equal and Ed’s well-being would be much lower if we chose A. Nebel’s
view therefore holds that we ought to choose B, just like our proposed egalitarian view.34
It is easy to see that Nebel’s view also agrees with the proposed form of egalitarianism
in Future Child 2. However, Person-Affecting Prioritarianism naturally arrives at differing
verdicts in Future Child 3. It reasons as follows, for all e > 0. No one could have a com-
plaint against a choice of A. If the mother develops type 1, Hal has no complaint since
he has a life worth living and he would not have existed otherwise. Furthermore, Ian
has no complaint because he does not exist. If the mother develops type 2, Ian has no
complaint since, in this state of the world, he is better off than if we had chosen B and
Hal has no complaint, since he does not exist. Nor could anyone have a complaint against
a choice of B. For Bmaximizes the conditional expected well-being of the only person who
would then exist. Therefore, by clause (iii) of Person-Affecting Prioritarianism, we ought to
choose the alternative that maximizes expected consequential value. According to Nebel,
because neither alternative involves any inequality between co-existents, this means we
should simply choose whatever maximizes expected total utility, which is A.35
In the previous section, I explained the reasons for arriving at a different judgment in
Future Child 3. To heighten the contrast between our views, I shall now consider
another case which Nebel uses to illustrate his view.36
Future Child 4. This case is exactly like the Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child
1, except that the treatments determine in which the state of the world each
31See Andrew Williams, The Priority View Bites the Dust? Utilitas, 24 (2012), 315–31.
32This form of prioritarianism is defined in n. 10.
33See Rabinowicz, Prioritarianism and Uncertainty.
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potential person will develop into a child. If we provide treatment A, then Dylan
will be born (and have an excellent quality of life) just in case the mother develops
type 1, and Ed will be born (and have a tolerable quality of life) just in case she
develops type 2. If we provide treatment B, then Ed will be born (and have a mod-
erately good quality of life) just in case the mother develops type 1, and Dylan will
be born (and have a moderately good quality of life) just in case the mother devel-
ops type 2. This case is depicted in Table 4.
Nebel argues as follows that, in this case, no one could have complaints against any
of the alternatives. No matter what we choose, the person who comes into existence has
a life worth living. Moreover, had we chosen otherwise, he would never have existed. By
clause (iii) of Person-Affecting Prioritarianism, we ought therefore to maximize
expected consequential value. Because neither alternative involves inequality between
co-existents, we should maximize expected total well-being, and choose A.37
Nebel endorses this implication of his view, but I submit that his form of prioritar-
ianism arrives at the wrong verdict in this case. For, contrary to Nebel, one can voice
a complaint on Ed’s behalf against a choice of A in Future Child 4 which is akin to
Ed’s complaint against a choice of A in the Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child
1. This complaint is, simply, that when the arrival of each was equally likely, a choice
of A set aside all potential benefits for one of the two possible children, when it was
instead possible to divide these expected benefits equally at little cost. This complaint
is not vitiated by the fact that in Future Child 4, if we choose A and Ed comes into exist-
ence, he will have a life worth living that he would not have had if we had chosen other-
wise. For this complaint is about how we acted to promote Dylan’s and Ed’s prospective
interests as rationally perceived at the moment of decision and not about what ended up
happening. Moreover, just as in Future Child 1, merely replying that we chose A in
order to secure greater aggregate expected advantage is inadequate, precisely because it
fails to acknowledge the fact that this is a case in which, at the moment of decision, pro-
spective persons’ interests conflict. Indeed, since it requires choosing A in Future Child 4
for all c > 0, Nebel’s view treats this case of conflicting interests just like the Intrapersonal
Scenario of Future Child 1. It thereby fails to follow a primary dictum of distributive mor-
ality, which is to track the difference between intra- and interpersonal trade-offs.
In contrast, our proposed form of egalitarianism assimilates Future Child 4 to the
Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child 1. It therefore captures the fact that these are
both cases in which we must balance the interests of two equally likely future indivi-
duals. Equal consideration of these conflicting interests requires arranging benefits to
these possible people’s equal expected advantage when the cost of doing so is small.
Table 4. Final well-being in Future Child 4
Alternative
State of the world
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It requires, in other words, that rather than giving one potential child excellent condi-
tional prospects and leaving the other with just tolerable life chances, we ensure that
both potential children have moderately good conditional prospects.38
6. Conclusion
The quality of possible future people’s life prospects is a matter of common concern.
So too, it seems to me, are inequalities in these prospects. For example, a future UK
parent who is planning to have only one child, as well as anyone concerned with that
future child’s well-being, can rightly regret that this child’s life expectancy will be
lower if they are born a boy than if they are born a girl, and lower if they are born
with a genetically caused impairment than if they are born a different person without
such an impairment. I have articulated and defended a form of egalitarianism which
reflects these concerns. The proposed view holds that we have reason to improve the
life prospects of anyone who, given our actions, has a chance of coming into existence
and reason to eliminate inequalities in such prospects. It holds, in other words, that
we recognize the value of each prospective person and the distinctiveness of their life
by striving to make the world welcoming to whoever might arrive, and equally so.
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Appendix
I here state one possible formalization of the form of egalitarianism for possible people proposed and con-
trast it with the view Fleurbaey and I have previously put forward.
Let wj,ki be individual i’s final well-being in the outcome that is generated by the choice of alternative j
and the occurrence of state of the world k. Let pk be the probability of state of the world k, and Si be the set
of states in which individual i exists. Then this individual’s conditional expected well-being, if alternative j is








38Nebel’s view faces a further challenge: it appears to violate the transitivity of ‘at least as choiceworthy
as’. Consider a choice between B from our Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child 1 and B from Future
Child 4. On Nebel’s view, these are equally choiceworthy. For no matter what we choose, the person
who comes into existence has a life worth living. Moreover, had we chosen otherwise, he would never
have existed. By clause (iii) of Person-Affecting Prioritarianism, we ought therefore to maximize conse-
quential value, which means we can permissibly choose either one. But we also know that, on his view,
option B from the Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child 1 is to be chosen over option A from that scen-
ario. Since A in the Interpersonal Scenario of Future Child 1 is identical to A in Future Child 4, by tran-
sitivity of ‘at least as choiceworthy as’, we have: in Future Child 4, B is at least as choiceworthy as A. But as
we have seen, on Nebel’s view, this is not so. Such intransitivities generate well-known challenges for
decision-making, including raising the question how this form of prioritarianism would choose from a
set of all three alternatives. By contrast, the form of egalitarianism for prospective people outlined here
respects transitivity, because it evaluates each alternative in isolation; its choiceworthiness therefore does
not depend on which alternatives it is being compared with.
16 Alex Voorhoeve
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In our earlier work, Fleurbaey and I take the relevant measure of how a person’s interests in an outcome are
advanced and were advanced at the time of decision to be a combination of this individual’s final well-being
in that outcome and their conditional expected well-being under this alternative.39 Moreover, we propose
that conditional expected well-being makes a positive, but diminishing marginal contribution to this meas-
ure. The formulation we propose is wj, ki + w(cewji), with w(.) a concave function.
The equally distributed equivalent, or EDE, is a particularly attractive form of pluralist egalitarianism.40
Formally, let ψ (.) be a concave function. When applied to this hybrid currency, a population of n possible
individuals and ne actually existing individuals, the EDE evaluates the outcome of action j when state of the








, where Oj,k is the set of all individuals who
exist in that outcome. This view thus evaluates each outcome by first taking the sum of the transformed
hybrid of final and conditional expected well-being for all people who exist in that outcome (and only
those people) and then taking the inverse of the original transformation function. The expected value of











Instead of a unified measure of how a person’s interests are (and have been) served in an outcome, the
more thoroughly egalitarian approach I propose here maintains two separate measures: final and
conditional expected well-being. In evaluating an outcome of alternative j in state k, it takes account of
the final well-being of every person who exists in that outcome. It also takes account of the conditional
expected well-being of all individuals who had a positive probability of existing given the choice of
















, where pji is individual i’s chance of existing given the choice
of j. The first term captures the EDE of the distribution of final well-being. The second term captures
the EDE of the distribution of conditional expected well-being across all individuals who had a chance
of existing, given the alternative chosen. In this second term, each individual’s conditional expected well-
being is weighted by their probability of existence, because inequality between two possible individuals mat-
ters more when these individuals are more likely to exist. The expected value of an alternative is then the
probability-weighted sum of the value of its possible outcomes (since the value of the distribution of con-



















39Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, Equality or Priority.
40The EDE was introduced in welfare economics in Serge-Christophe Kolm, The Optimal Production of
Social Justice, in Public Economics, ed. by Julius Margolis and Henri Guitton (London: Macmillan, 1969),
pp. 145–200 and Anthony Atkinson, On the Measurement of Inequality, Journal of Economic Theory, 2
(1970), 244–63. On its merits as a measure of social welfare under risk, see Marc Fleurbaey, Assessing
Risky Social Situations, Journal of Political Economy, 118 (2010), 649–80 and Michael Otsuka and Alex
Voorhoeve, Equality versus Priority, in The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, ed. by Serena
Olsaretti (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 65–85.
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